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CHAPTER 1 
TROUBLES WITH TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS: PUTTING THE MORAL 
AIMS OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
TO THE FORE 
Margaret URBAN WALKER 
. 
'There would be such a thing as "the truth about the past" only if there were one most 
basic question about the past that was the concern of those inquiring into it, and 
there is no such question'. 
Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness' 
The rapid proliferation of truth commissions has attracted intense and sustained 
attention. Depending on how one defines and counts them, there have been 
more than thirty and possibly more than forty such commissions in the past 
several decades. 2 Attention by researchers, scholars, and participants tracking 
the rationales, operations, and outcomes of truth commissions escalated sharply 
in response to South Africa's innovative, controversial, and globally visible Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in the mid-1990s. The scholarly attention to 
truth commissions has ranged from endorsement to scepticism. As early as 2001, 
in the introduction to the first edition of her landmark study of truth 
commissions, Priscilla Hayner says, 'Unfortunately, many comfortable 
assumptions have been restated over and over again in untested assertions by 
otherwise astute and careful writers, thinkers, and political leaders.'3 High 
I 
2 
3 
B. WILLIAMS. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 2002. at 257. 
For lists. see M. FREEMAN, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 2006; G. DANCY, H. KIM, and E. WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, 'The 
Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission Experimentation', (2010) 9 Journal of Human 
Rights, at 45-64; T.D. OLSEN, L.A. PAYNE, and A.G. REITER, Transitional Justice in Balance: 
Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy, Washington, D.C.: United States Institutes of Peace, 
2010; and P.B. HAYNER, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions, New York: Routledge. second edition. 2011. 
P.B. HAYNER, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York: 
Routledge. first edition. 2001, at 7. 
Intersentia 7 
Margaret Crban Walker 
expectations and incautious generalisations, however, are increasingly being 
submitted to more careful scrutiny and methodologically rigorous attempts at 
empirical confirmation.4 
Analysis of the roles, values, or effects of truth commissions is dauntingly 
complex. Claims about the aims of truth commissions encompass moral, civic, 
political, social, psychological, epistemological, and historical objectives. The 
varied aims of truth commissions can also focus on different levels and actors: 
the victims of political repression and violence, individual perpetrators, and the 
institutions and institutional cultures of a society that are implicated in abuses, 
as well as prevalent behaviours and self-understandings of social groups or 
society as a whole. Truth commissions have been said to do or aim at many 
things: to establish a clear and authoritative record of a period of abuses, 
including their causes, patterns, and circumstances; to restore the dignity and 
address the suffering of victims and their families; to prevent like abuses from 
recurring in the future; to create public accountability of individual perpetrators 
and societal institutions, and to examine complicity in a society at large; to 
make recommendations for reform, reparations, and prosecutions; to educate 
the public and to prevent denial and revisionism about eras of abuse; to create a 
new national narrative or a unifying collective memory; to promote democracy, 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights; to contribute to national 
reconciliation.s Many of these objectives concern hoped-for outcomes (such as 
4 
5 
8 
While not uncritical, some early accounts entertained far-reaching psychological. social, and 
political effects of truth commissions. See M. MINOW, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1998; R. TEITEl., Transitional Justice, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000; R.1. ROTBERG and D. THOMPSON (eds.), Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth 
Commissions, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000; and T.G. PHELPS, Shattered 
Voices: Language, Violence, and the Work of Truth Commissions, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Recent work is more consistently critical or even skeptical about 
the purposes and impacts of truth commissions. See T. KELSALL, 'Truth, Lies, Ritual: 
Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone', (2005) 
27 Human Rights Quarterly, at 361-391; R. SHAW, 'Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone', (2005) 130 United States Institute of Peace Special 
Repo rt, www.usip.org/ pu blica tionsl reth in king -trut h -and -reconciliation -com m iss ions-lessons-
sierra-leone, accessed 27 March 2014; B.A. LEEBAW, 'The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional 
Justice', (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly, at 95-118; DALY, 'Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry 
into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition', (2008) 2 The International Journal of 
Transitional Justice, at 23-41; B. HAMBER, Transforming Societies after Political Violence: 
Truth, Reconciliation. and Mental Health, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009; E. WIEBELHAUS-
BRAHM, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies, New York: Routledge, 2010; T.D. 
OLSEN, L.A. PAYNE, and A.G. REITER, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, 
Weighing Efficacy, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010; O.N.T. 
THOMS, J. RON, and R. PARIS, 'State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?', 
(2010) 4 The International Journal of Transitional Justice, at 329-354. 
These claims are repeated Widely in what is now a large and mUltidisciplinary literature, 
including truth commission mandates and reports. A very short list of works that discuss 
truth commission aims and uses includes: J.E. MENDEZ, 'Accountability for Past Abuses', 
(1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly, at 255-82; MINOW, supra note 4; TEITEL, supra note 4; P.B. 
HAYNER, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 
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healing for victims or prevention of human rights abuses) that can be described 
and possibly measured in the wake of a truth commission's operation. tJ 
Telling the truth, within the scope of its mandate, about abuses in an era of 
repression or conflict is the least contestable aim of a truth commission. In 
this chapter, I focus on questions and criticisms concerning specifically 'the 
truth of the truth commission'. Part of my goal is to identify some distinct 
kinds of questions about the truth that a truth commission should try to tell. 
Looking at some actual and prominent critiques, I distinguish several distinct 
kinds of concerns: concern with lack of methodological rigor in truth finding; 
concern with decisions and practices of truth finding that produce problematic 
silences; and pursuing the 'wrong' truth, one that fails to meet the real needs 
of a society in transition or impedes the realisation of what those needs are. 
More important, however, is what I hope these distinctions help to reveal: 
that there is a difference between a set of technical, methodological, 
organisational, and practical questions about how best to pursue and establish 
certain kinds of truths and a set of moral and political questions about which 
truths and whose truths it is important for a truth commission to tell. Both of 
these kinds of questions are fundamental to the work of truth commissions, but 
they are radically different kinds of questions. A truth commission is limited by 
its task-orientation, timing, organisation, expertise and resources, which pose 
difficult practical and technical questions about how to accomplish its work 
effectively. But it is the highly contestable moral and political questions about 
which truth it is urgent to find or acknowledge that alone can set the goal to 
which the practical questions are directed and to which they remain 
6 
New York: Routledge, second edition, 2011; B. HAMBER and R.A. WILSON, 'Symbolic closure 
through memory, reparation and revenge in post-conflict societies', (2002) I Journal oj 
Human Rights, at 35-53; T.A. BORER (ed.), Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building 
in Post-Conflict Societies, Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. See 
also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Rule-oj-Law Tools Jor 
Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2006, 
available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawTruthCommissionsen.pdf, 
accessed 27 March 2014. The United States Institutes of Peace provides a compendium of 
truth commission mandates and reports, at www-dev.usip.org/category/publications/truth-
commission, accessed 27 March 2014. 
In addition to the critiques discussed below in section I, significant critiques of claimed truth 
commission outcomes, especially concerning outcomes for victims and securing democracy 
and human rights, are: D. MENDELOFF, 'Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict 
Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?', (2004) 6 International Studies Review, at 355-380, and 
D. MENDELOFF, 'Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects 
of Post-Conflict Justice', (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly, at 592-623; DALY, supra note 4; 
HAMBER, supra note 4; WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 4; and OLSEN, et al., supra note 4. 
Multiple practical challenges and escalating demands on truth commissions are discussed by 
P. DEGREIFF, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation 
and guarantees of non-recurrence', United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/24/42, 
28 August 2013. 
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subordinate. The multiple and diverse limits of truth commissions suggest the 
need for extension, disaggregation, and proliferation of truth recovery practices. 
1. TRUTH SCEPTICISM(S) 
Scepticism about the truth that truth commissions do or can tell comes in many 
varieties. I do not address wholesale scepticism about the possibility of producing 
some significant reasonably well-warranted findings. I take seriously that there 
are many facts to be unearthed, individual experiences to be told, and well-
warranted generalisations and explanatory narratives to be constructed by a 
truth commission. Instead, I want to look at three concerns about the truth that 
a truth commission might actually have told or that it undertakes to tell: 
concerns about undisciplined and incomplete truth; truth that creates silences; 
and telling the wrong truth. 
Audrey Chapman and Patrick Ball offer an incisive assessment of the 
methodological and epistemological limitations that affect the ability of a truth 
commission to provide 'an official authoritative account of a contested past [ ... J . 
in an objective and careful manner consistent with strict standards of historical 
and social scientific research? Drawing on a study of commissions in Haiti, 
South Africa, and Guatemala, Chapman and Ball are most concerned that a 
focus on the 'micro-truth' of individual cases, collected unsystematically 
through victim or survivor statements and testimonies that are prone to 
subjective limitations and distortions of memory, cannot furnish the 
'comprehensive' sort of truth that commissions are charged to discover. This 
truth is the 'macro-truth' about 'the magnitude of the violence, the patterns, the 
trends, and the locations in which it took place', as well as ideological and 
organisational factors.BThey are entirely aware that truth commissions are 
meant to serve many ends that compete for attention, and to find many kinds of 
truth that will not be equally accessible under constraints of time, resources, 
political will, cooperation, and evidence, as well as choices of operation and 
design. In response to this, they propose that truth commissions should dedicate 
themselves to the large scale macro-truth of contexts, causes, and patterns of 
violation rather than the micro-truth of particular events, cases, and people.9 
This clarified focus will dedicate resources to a disciplined social scientific 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A.R. CHAPMAN and P. BALL, 'The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from 
Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala', (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly, 1-43, at 4. See also in 
this vein the outstanding collection on South Africa's TRC, A.R. CHAPMAN and H. VAN DER 
MERWE (eds.), Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver?, Philadelphia: 
UniverSity of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 
CHAPMAN and BALL, supra note 7, at 7. 
CHAPMAN and BALL, supra note 7, at 41. 
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approach that seeks, and has a better chance of finding, broad explanations 
through 'verifiable scientific best practices'.!O 
Chapman's and Ball's critique, taken as an analysis of how different choices, 
procedures. and methods of truth finding produce or preclude certain kinds of 
truth, is acute and invaluable. To the extent that a truth commission's job is to 
produce that big, data-intensive, and methodologically regimented picture, they 
are right to point out that much of what truth commissions do is either not 
directed to that end, or does not serve it well. Taken, however, as a guide for the 
correct operation of a truth commission, the analysis is more problematic: is a 
truth commission best understood as a process of regimented social science 
research? Should a sCientifically controlled research project become the 
controlling truth commission function? Their own final recommendations, in 
fact, curiously fail to integrate two disparate objectives. They propose that the 
findings of a commission must be 'unequivocal, massive, objective, and 
undeniable, and made according to scientific best practices,' and (in the next 
sentence) that 'the findings should be victim-centred, telling the story from their 
point of view and validating their experiences'.1l 
Their argument, however, is entirely on the side of the first objective, 
consistently criticising precisely the forms of attention and participation that 
have made truth commissions victim-centred and validating (to the extent that 
they are). These include non-adversarial interviews and (increasingly, for a 
minority of victims) testimonies, and attention to the details of particular cases 
that respectfully witnesses the abuses of particular people and the suffering of 
particular survivors, rendering structural contexts and statistical patterns vivid 
and concrete as human stories with profound human costs. They offer an 
opportunity or even an imperative for societies to look directly at specific acts of 
brutality and oppression whose legacies they carry and an opportunity for 
victims to seek both acknowledgement and redress. 12 Chapman and Ball find 
this orientation to the details of individual cases 'legalistic' in its emphaSis on 
discrete violations of human rights norms and its use of individual cases as 
illustrations or examples. But this facet, which is the human face of the truth 
commission, expresses its moral purpose and its society's political commitments. 
A society in transition both needs and is owed an objective and impartial finding 
of facts about the causes, circumstances, and patterns of its history of violence 
and repression, and victims as members of society share in the value and 
meaning of such a public and historical reckoning.B But if a truth commission 
10 
11 
12 
13 
CHAPMAN and BALL. supra note 7, at 42. 
CHAPMAN and BALL, supra note 7, at 42. 
L.J. LAPLANTE and K. THEIDON, 'Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparations in Post-
Truth Commission Peru', (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly, at 228-250, stress the 
expectations of reciprocity. especially reparations. that motivate many victims to testify. 
Emerging recognition of a right to the truth for individual victims of human rights abuses 
includes as well the collective right of societies to know their histories of oppression. See 
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does not hear, record, acknowledge, and address victims, and thus exhibit the 
concrete meaning of human rights standards and the human costs of their 
violation in a publicly visible space, a truth commission becomes a research 
project, controlled by 0. professional staff that ensures 'qualitative and 
quantitative rigor'.14 The victim-centred, validating, and dignifying functions 
(which Chapman and Ball themselves call 'perhaps the central premise on which 
truth commission are founded'), as well as the crucial public civil pedagogy of 
human rights and political wrongs, which have played a role in defining the 
institution of the truth commissions, do not have anywhere obvious to go.15 The 
question arises: how do we know which truth a truth commission is supposed to 
tell? 
The question persists in a second kind of critique that targets the ways in 
which a truth commission, in setting its mandate and terms of reference and 
deciding on its emphasis and operations, effectively causes some truths, or some 
tellers, to be silenced or obscured. Insofar as truth commissions do incorporate, 
even feature, victim testimonies in their proceedings or reports, they will, in 
Laurie Beth Clark's description, 'favour certain kinds of stories (possibly the 
most horrific ones), certain kinds of simplifications of the story (so that listeners' 
loyalties are not diminished by ambiguities and complexities), and certain kinds 
of storytellers (those with effective and culturally specific acting skills as well as 
identity positions familiar to listeners)'.16 Such 'staging' of the truth is inevitable, 
although it can be either more deliberate or more unreflective. On the deliberate 
end, Chapman and Ball point out that the South Africa TRC's disproportionate 
display of white victims in its public hearings cohered with a strategy of showing 
that wrong was done 'on all sides'. I? Yet truth commission mandates inherently 
14 
15 
16 
17 
12 
United Nations, 'Study on the right to the truth: Report of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights', United Nations Document E/CNA/2006/91, 
8 February 2006; and United Nations, 'Impunity: Report of the independent expert to update 
the Set of principles to combat impunity, DIANE ORENTLICHER, Addendum, Updated Set of 
principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat 
impunity', United Nations Document E/CNA/20051102/Add. 1,8 February 2005. 
CHAPMAN and BALL, supra note 7, at 43. 
CHAPMAN and BALL, supra note 7, at 12. On the human rights pedagogy of truth 
commissions, see M.U. WALKER, 'Nunca Mas: Truth Commissions, Prevention, and Human 
Rights Culture', in L. MAY and E. EDENBERG (eds.), Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
L.B. CLARK, 'Performing Truth', in K. BILBIjA, J.E. FAIR, C.E. MILTON, and L.A. PAYNE (eds.), 
The Art of Truth-Telling About Authoritarian Rule, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2005, at 84-85. 
CHAPMAN and BALL, supra note 7, at 39-40. See also A.R. CHAPMAN and P. BALL, 'Levels of 
Truth: Macro-Truth and the TRC', in CHAPMAN and VAN DER MERWE (eds.), Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver?, at 143-168. James Gibson's large study of 
TRC effects, however, sees the identification of abuses on all sides as making a positive 
contribution to reconciliation in the South African case, in J.L. GIBSON, Overcoming 
Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004, 
at 75-77 and at 335-338. 
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set the terms for which acts will be investigated and which victims of violence 
(and rarely, as in the South African case, which perpetrators of abuses) can be 
heard, whether they ponder all of the consequences of exclusion. Beyond a truth 
commission's terms of reference, exclusion or self-selection may be determined 
de facto by the nature of the truth recovery process and the situations of victims. 
Priscilla Hayner discusses persisting problems of hearing women's stories in 
truth commissions, whether this involves under-reporting of violations against 
women, cultural suppression of women's speech, material obstacles (of finances, 
responsibilities, or mobility) to participation, or impediments to putting sexual 
violence on the agenda of truth commissions as a central instance of human 
rights abuse. IS Despite efforts at 'gender-sensitive' truth commission design, 
staffing, and operations, problems of exclusion and misrepresentation of women 
may persist. Kimberly Theidon, in her studies of truth recovery and 
reconciliation in Peru, claims that stigma, shame, pressure from men, and local 
policing of what a community should talk about diminished reporting of sexual 
violence (despite appropriately broad definitions and successful outreach).19 Yet 
when victim categories are known to be of special interest to a truth commission 
and suggest potential avenues of redress, there are incentives within 
communities to exhibit the kinds of victimisation in question, including sexual 
violence. 2o Julie Guillerot points to the Peruvian truth commission's serious 
documentation of sexual violence and its role in making sexual violence visible, 
but provides detailed analysis of how the report's recommendations 'failed to 
reflect the complexity of the crimes and secondary damages suffered by women 
and girls during the conflict.'21 A complex and dyna.mic interaction of truth 
commission terms and procedures, community hierarchies of power, deep 
background gender inequalities, and individual calculations determines who 
speaks and what a commission is likely to hear and emphasise. 
Gender is but one dimension of potential exclusion in projects of truth 
recovery. The cultural acceptability of confessional or confrontational truth 
telling and its timing should constrain how truth recovery is understood and 
18 
19 
20 
21 
HAYNER, supra note 2, 85-90. See also Inlernational Center for Transitional Justice, written 
by V. NESIAH, Truth Commissions and Gender: Principles, Policies, and Procedures, New York: 
International Center for Transitional Justice, 2006. 
K. THEIDON, 'Gender in Transition: Common Sense, Women, and War', (2007) 6 Journal of 
Human Rights 453-478, at 457-·459. For broader discussion, see K. THEIDON, Intimate 
Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013. 
THEIDON, supra note 19, at 462. 
J. GUILLEROT, 'Linking Gender and Reparations in Peru: A Failed Opportunity', in R. RUBIO-
MARIN (ed.), What Happened To The Women?: Gender and Reparations for Human Rights 
Violations, New York: Social Science Research Council, 2006, at 150- 154. See 140-145 on the 
coverage of sexual violence; Guillerot cites the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Volume VI, Chapter 1, Section 1.5 on sexual violence and Volume VIII, Chapter 
2, Section 2.1 on its gendered impacts. 
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when (even perhaps whether) it should occur.22 The nature of conflict and the 
persistence and centrality of post-conflict identities may either block or postpone 
any authoritative truth recovery. or favour local and bottom-up projects; several 
investigators have found this in the uneasy peace in Northern Ireland.23 The very 
categories of 'victim' and 'perpetrator' (made even more precise by the mandate 
to investigate a certain set of offenses) can flatten complexity, suggesting 
mutually exclusive and perhaps internally homogeneous categories. even as they 
obscure lines of authority. chains of command, and institutional structures and 
cultures that play central roles in the occurrence and legitimation of violence. 24 
Jelena Subotic argues that elevating individual accountability in transitional 
justice mechanisms (including trials and truth commissions) deflects attention 
from state responsibility and widespread societal complicity or denial (and its 
roots in shared norms. beliefs, and practices); without these, large scale and 
syslematic violence and repression either might not or could not occur.2S 
Victims who fall within the mandated categories to be heard by a truth 
commission may fail to or decline to participate for reasons ranging from 
objection to the 'victim' category itself. to a sense of futility in pursuing justice, 
to finding themselves unable to cope with their trauma. or to reconciling their 
own needs for healing or honouring bonds with their dead on the political 
timeline of the transition. The psychologist Brandon Hamber writes movingly of 
the 'gap' between the pace of individual psychological processes and collective 
political ones. so that survivors' needs may not intersect with political 
imperatives to move along and move on.26 Truth commissions are inherently 
22 
23 
24 
2S 
26 
14 
KELSALL, supra note 4 and SHAW, supra note 4 explore this issue. J. BRAITHWAITE, 'Partial 
truth and reconciliation in the longue duree', (2011) 6 Contemporary Social Science, at 129-
146, explores the uncoupling of truth and reconciliation, and the priority of local 
reconciliation to truth-telling, in several Pacific contexts. 
See B. HAMBER, 'Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South Africa and 
Northern Ireland', (2002-2003) 26 Fordham International Law Journal, at 1074-1094; 
B. ROLSTON, 'Dealing with the Past: Pro-State Paramilitaries, Truth and Transition in 
Northern Ireland', (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly, at 652-675; P. LUNDY and" 
M. McGovERN, 'Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up', (2008) 
35 Journal of Law and Society, at 265-292. 
See T.A. BORER, 'A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators: Human Rights and Reconciliation 
in South Africa', (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly, at 1088- 1116. 
J. SUBOTIC, 'Expanding the scope of post-contlict justice: Individual, state and societal 
responsibility for mass atrocity', (2011) 48 Journal of Peace Research, at 157-169. See also 
N. DIMITRIJEVIC, 'Justice beyond Blame: Moral Justification of (The Idea of) a Truth 
Commission', (2006) 50 Journal of Conflict Resolution, at 368-382, on the transformation of 
political culture, at 377, including a culture of silence, at 378-379. Dimitrijevic, however, 
holds that a truth commission has to return a SOciety to its former 'civilised values', not an 
assumption that will fit many, perhaps most, cases of mass atrOcity and authoritarian 
repression. See also, N.V. NWOGu, 'When and Why It Started: Deconstructing Victim-
Centered Truth Commissions in the Context of Ethnicity-Based Contlict', (2010) 4 The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, at 275-289. 
B. HAMBER, 'fransforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation, and Mental 
Health, Dordrecht: Springer. 2009, at 70 and 89-93. 
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transient, have a job to do, and operate at most for a few years; grief and extreme 
traumatisation (including the need and the ability to 'tell one's story') follow no 
schedule. The choices truth commissions make and the ones made for them by 
the terms of their mandate (set by executive order, national legislation, or 
brokered peace agreements) define a conceptual universe of offences and victims 
and construct a practical process of outreach, interviews, and hearings that will 
leave many opportunities to hear some of the truth, and many people who could 
tell it, behind. 
These limitations of mandate, design, and process operate given an idea of 
what larger story needs to be told. There is also a question of what that larger 
story itself is. Explicit terms of reference in a commission's mandate place certain 
events, acts, or persons in or out of the line of inquiry. Chapman and Ball note 
that Guatemala's Commission on Historical Clarification defined the period for 
investigation as beginning with internal armed confrontation in 1962, not with a 
1954 coup organised by the United States' CIA, thus implicating guerrilla 
activity as the beginning of the war.27 Chile's National Commission on Truth 
and Reconciliation (1990-1991), its first and internationally influential truth 
commission, allowed investigation only of crimes of deadly force, ultimately 
numbering several thousand. It required a second commission, the National 
Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (2003-2005) to recognise 
over 28,000 cases of political imprisonment, many involving torture. 28 
Mahmood Mamdani, an early and persistent critic of the scope and operation of 
South Africa's TRC, argues that the Commission chose to define terms of its 
mandate precisely in ways that 'rewrote' the story of apartheid, evading the 
examination of it as a political system, reducing the principal actors to political 
activists and state agents, individualising victims and winnowing them to those 
who were subject to a small schedule of abuses, extending impunity to most 
perpetrators of the system, and so failing to support precisely its own finding 
that apartheid was a crime against humanity.29 The truth of a truth commission 
is precisely a commissioned truth. There is no evading questions addressing on 
whose behalf and to what ends the truth should be commissioned. 
2. DIFFERENT KINDS OF QUESTIONS 
I have reviewed concerns about methodologically loose pursuits of the truth; 
questions, terms, or procedures that have the effect of putting some truths to the 
27 
28 
29 
CHAPMAN and BALL, supra note 7, at 13. 
On the two commissions, see HAYNER, supra note 2, at 47-49 and 60-62. 
M. MAMDANI, 'Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC)" in M. DU PLESSIS and S. PETE (eds.), 
Repairing the Past? International Perspectives on Reparations for Gross Human Rights Abuses, 
Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2007. 
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side or silencing some voices; and wholesale ways of defining the subject of 
investigation that arguably systematically misdirect truth finding efforts, using 
prominent examples of these critiques. I suggest that these concerns may be 
divided into practical or technical questions, on the one hand, and moral or 
political ones, on the other. But this distinction between the technical and the 
moral does not line up in a simple way with the criticisms canvassed. 
Methodological criticisms (including staffing, . organisation, and data 
management issues) fall mostly in the category of the technical, yet some choices 
about the collection and representation of information fall into the category of 
moral decisions, for example whom to interview and how to do it, when 
individuals with crucial information are not research subjects but are likely to 
include victims, relatives of victims, witnesses, and perpetrators. In their study 
of victim participation in Peru's truth commission, La Plante and Theidon 
suggest that victims (whose testimony is essential to the core function of getting 
the truth and to a public pedagogy concerning the reality and nature of violence) 
rarely come to the truth commission out of a simple desire to be heard but come 
with expectations of satisfaction and reparation, a sense of 'implicit contract' 
that anticipates reciprocity in the form of some reparative response from the 
state. 30 Brandon Hamber discusses the sense of disillusionment or betrayal for 
some victims of South Africa's TRC when they did not learn more about their 
own cases. 31 One cannot object to the view that a truth commission should use, 
to the extent possible, effective means of investigation to get to the truth it must 
tell. But to urge a truth commission to largely limit its role to obtaining large-
scale objective truths through scientific methodology either implicitly embeds or 
merely bypasses moral and political judgements on what work it is important for 
a truth commission to do, and whose rights or needs must be served by this 
work. These are not matters for technical or expert determination. 
Wholesale or broad-ranging criticism of the truth a truth commission is 
designed to (or decides to) tell is, on the other hand, squarely in the domain of 
the moral and political. Mamdani's critique, for example, argues that the greatest 
wrong for which South Africa needed to account was the crime against humanity 
that was the apartheid system and its massive means of implementation (forced 
removals, pass laws, forced labour, and illegal detention) and that the public 
pedagogy of human rights and responsibilities was misdirected into a narrowly 
drawn and falsely individualised focus. I do not mean to endorse Mamdani's 
analysis of the TRC, but to point to the clearly moral and political nature of his 
critique: he argues that the TRC failed the great majority of South Africa's 
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victims, drastically contained just demands for reparations, and promoted 
reconciliation defined for a political elite.32 
Problems of omitting truths and silencing voices, on the other hand, can be 
either practical or moral. Some exclusions are practical limitations subject to 
practical fixes, such as outreach, public participation in design, framing of the 
commission's work, gender-sensitivity, and so forth. Other exclusions result 
from choices guided (rightly or wrongly) by how a truth commission's moral 
purpose and political impact is understood. A choice to individualise 
responsibility or to point to wrongs on all sides can be a deliberate choice 
motivated by the belief that a truth commission's work can in this way better 
promote peace or reconciliation in a post-conflict setting with polarised views 
and oppositional identities. 
Sorting into practical-technical and moral-political questions is, I argue, 
important. Without slighting the complexities of adopting (or adapting) 
methods of research and analysis for a truth commission, given decisions about 
what truth must be told, these technical questions are subordinate to the 
decisions about which truth must be told, in whose service, and with what 
purposes. The latter are what I am calling the 'moral and political' questions. 
Furthermore, the practical and technical questions will often have relatively 
determinate answers (even if not unique ones) and a lot of scope for instrumental 
reasoning and prediction that can adjust means to desired ends. The moral and 
political questions, however, are inevitably going to be contestable, and not 
generally questions of effective means to ends, as the debate will turn on the 
fulfilment of competing moral and political values and obligations. These are in 
many cases questions about weighing and balancing values and obligations, 
rather than producing outcomes, and about appreciating the evaluative 
meanings that certain public processes embody or can come to carry, perhaps 
differently for different segments of the public for whom a truth commission 
operates. 
Truth commissions are not just any kind of investigative venture. They have a 
moral and political agenda. They are a distinct kind of institution that has 
emerged for a transitional political context with some characteristic features; 
they are among the core measures believed to serve some demands associated 
with justice in that context; and they have proliferated rapidly, with relationships 
of influence through technical assistance and consultation, borrowing, and 
lessons learned. This does not mean that there is one precise and preordained 
format or canonical aim for a truth commission, but it does mean that what we 
have come to call a truth commission is keyed to the context of a post-conflict or 
post-repression political transition and is intimately entwined with a · certain 
kind of moral project that is recurrent, pOinted, and urgent in that situation. 
Truth commission mandates and reports, for example, invariably propose to 
32 MAMDANI, supra note 29, especially at 116. 
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affirm, restore, or honour the dignity of victims of violence, and to contribute to 
the prevention of abuses in the future through a clear documentation and 
condemnation of what transpired in the past. 33 Reports or mandates also 
sometimes claim to combat impunity, contribute to accountability, rebut denial, 
or foster national reconciliation. Through various iterations internationally, 
moral and political objectives and aspirations such as these have become 
associated with truth commissions. Truth commissions, along with criminal 
accountability, administrative exclusions for perpetrators, and reparations and 
remembrance for victims, bear part of the weight and carry part of the meaning 
of justice in transition. 34 
Without suggesting that there is a formula that fits all cases or renders 
competing demands commensurable, I will refer to this characteristic 
constellation of concerns as the truth commission's gesture of 'moral reclamation 
and political legitimation'. 35 This is not a novel idea, and that is part of my point. 
This is what we have learned to expect from this distinctive transitional 
institution. It is only one gesture of moral and political transformation, but it has 
some distinctive work to do in telling some version of the larger story of what 
happened, why it was wrong, who was harmed, who is responsible, and how all 
this entails responsibilities for society.36 The challenge for any particular truth 
commission is how to conduct an inquiry that embodies an affirmation or 
reaffirmation of basic moral decency (usually captured in the ostensibly 
universal language and categories of human rights); that is responsive to victims 
whose suffering, dignity, and rights must be acknowledged and whose needs 
must be addressed; that offers its society an accounting, and some forms of 
accountability, institutional or individual; and that offers lessons of reform and 
prevention. 
The difficult task that faces every truth commission is how to incorporate 
and prioritise these goals; those decisions will constrain which truth and whose 
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truth a commission will attempt to find and tell. These decisions will not achieve 
universal consent nor are they matters for unilateral expert determination 
(although what it is feasible to attempt and how to make it happen require many 
kinds of expert input). These decisions will be found either more or less 
reasonable and responsible by various publics) and the fact that truth 
commissions have often been described as 'victim-centred) (though they might 
or might not in fact conform to this ideal) suggests that the needs of victims do 
and must have an especially central role. How these decisions are taken) 
explained) and implemented in the context of the larger transitional process will 
determine how much and for whom they lend initial legitimacy to the new 
political order. There is not and cannot be a single kind of truth (micro or macro; 
individualised or collective; objective and causal or subjective and experiential) 
that can reasonably claim it is 'the) truth that a truth commission must tell. Yet 
truth commissions are invariably time-pressured) under-resourced) over-
mandated) and imperfectly staffed. They are also not unreasonably politically 
strategic; a successor or reconstituted regime may need to prioritise and 
harmonise some set of transitional measures in the short term in a way that is 
hoped (correctly or not) to promote legitimacy and stability. The concerns I have 
reviewed about inadequately disciplined findings) truths that silence) and telling 
the wrong story are serious ones. I have sorted through them to better 
understand them) not to set them aside. There are indeed too many truths and 
not enough truth commission capacity to go around. What might these concerns 
constructively suggest? 
3. TRUTH TAKES TIME 
Fletcher) Weinstein) and Rowen suggest that societies will in fact experience 
'open-ended processes of reckoning) and that 'conceiving transitional justice as 
an ongoing process of transformation that may be initiated by a set of 
interventions rather than defined as these interventions may be more useful'Y 
This view might be applied to truth-telling. A truth commission that occurs in 
the transitional short term might be seen as initiating rather than constituting a 
society)s reckoning with its multi-layered and contested truths. There are several 
implications. One is that the first job of a truth commission is public clarity 
about its moral and political objectives and honest expectation-setting about its 
operation and impact. A truth commission will need to inspire) and it will need 
extensive cooperation which it should not assume comes free. But it needs to set 
a limited and specific agenda and to avoid creating hopes it will not fulfil. This 
37 L.E. FLETCHER and H.M. WEINSTEIN with J. ROWEN. 'Context. Timing and the Dynamics of 
Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective'. (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly. 163-220. at 
216-217. 
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might be achieved to some extent by the coordinated operation of a truth 
commission's inquiry with other transitional measures, perhaps most especially 
with reparations. 38 Beyond this, however, a truth commission (especially when it 
occurs early in a transitional process) might be explicitly positioned as an 
initiation, rather than a culmination, of a society's commitment to recover the 
truth about its troubled past. 
A truth commission should acknowledge the need to continue the task that 
it, with all its limitations, only begins. This resolve could be expressed both in 
the truth commission's own mandate and work as well as in the way a truth 
commission might be positioned as one among other successive or continuing 
truth-recovery initiatives. A truth commission's task characteristically includes 
recommendations; among its central recommendations should be that truth 
recovery continue through varied projects and institutions. It could thus present 
itself explicitly as an opening instalment in a long-term process of working 
through gaps, silences, and currently unavailable information and testimonies 
that might be forthcoming later, It could set agendas for rigorous empirical 
projects, rich qualitative studies, professional historical inquiries, and forensic 
projects of exhumation and investigation that could use but go beyond the · 
archive a commission amasses. It could invite or initiate local micro-projects of 
intracommunal story-telling and remembrance, and intercommunal dialogue 
and history-writing, as well as continuing public education through school 
curricula, public discourse, and commemoration. It might establish an open-
ended process for receiving testimonies and documentation, adding them to an 
archive with both popular and professional access. John Braithwaite, based on 
studies of the 'Peacebuilding Compared' project, has suggested the policy of 
permanent truth commissions that 'keep their doors open as long as is needed', 
because of the time it takes victims and perpetrators to tell the truth; possibly, 
after 100 years, the truth commission would exist as a museum or repository of 
testimonies and other information. 39 Whether or not this is a practically feasible 
idea, it envisages a deliberately open-ended and long-term process of uncovering 
and preserving truths that could have varied implementations. Limitations of 
truth commissions also suggest a disaggregation of truth recovery, with diverse 
formats and portals operating concurrently or successively at different levels, so 
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that truth finding means can be finely adjusted to the kinds of truth pursued and 
needs served in pursuing it.4o 
A truth commission might either be seen as initiating a planned sequence or 
medley of truth finding and truth preserving processes, or simply as being one 
among diverse truth recovery initiatives that a society puts on its agenda both for 
and beyond the transition. In either case, a truth commission is unburdened 
• 
from having to promise or to attempt too many truths of too many kinds. 
Braithwaite also challenges transitional justice orthodoxy that supposes a 
necessary connection and privileged sequence in which truth is a prior condition 
of reconciliation. Braithwaite's research on a number of Pacific cases suggests 
that local reconciliation in some cases can occur not only in spite of but also 
because of silences and lies, yet that reconciliation can in turn create conditions 
for truth to be spoken over the long term, locally or top-down.41 Nor is it likely 
that all the truth a society needs to hear and digest is a truth officially 
commissioned and told as an official story. Bottom-up, participatory modes of 
truth telling can have strengths complementary to top-down truth telling and 
might reveal and strengthen justice capacities that exist outside of or below the 
state.42 Whether truth telling should happen early on the transitional timeline or 
not needs careful consideration in context; but the idea that early truth telling is 
all the truth telling there will be or need be is unsuited to any context. Open-
ended ness and disaggregation allow for the possibility not only of accumulation 
but of rectifications and clarifications of truth over the long haul. 
4. CONCLUSION 
There is no one most basic question about the past and there is no one institution 
or process that allows a society or community to capture all of its needed truths. 
A truth commission is a limited transitional institution that supplies one 
component of a moral and political intervention. This intervention should Signal 
and propel a larger and longer project of finding, rethinking, and preserving a 
society's truth. If the early response to truth commissions was often celebration, 
and current responses often involve scepticism, a future agenda for societal truth 
recovery should be to think clearly and carefully both about but also beyond 
what a truth commission can do. 
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